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ABSTRACT How does the historical legacy 
of agriculture affect democratic traditions in 
contemporary societies? This paper provides 
empirical evidence that inherent crop yield 
and democracy exhibit an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. This finding is supported by 
cross-country data from up to 147 countries, 
186 pre-colonial societies, and the U.S. states. 
The relationship thus exhibits a highly per-
sistent pattern. Crop yield is measured by ki-
localories per hectare per year under rain-fed 
conditions, which has the advantage of being 
highly exogenous. The hump-shaped relation-
ship holds up to a battery of robustness tests. 
(JEL O11, O13)
1. Introduction
Since the Neolithic Revolution, agriculture 
has historically been the dominant sector and 
remains so today in many developing econo-
mies. How does this legacy affect democratic 
traditions in contemporary societies? This 
paper contributes to the literature by showing 
that the level of democracy is associated with 
the inherent productivity of land. In particu-
lar, crop yield and democracy form a robust 
inverted U-shaped relationship. 
Stylized facts provide strong motivation 
for our analysis. Galor and Özak (2016) pro-
vide an index of potential crop yield in million 
kilocalories per hectare per year.1 Countries 
1 Galor and Özak (2016) utilize data from the Global 
Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project of the Food and Ag-
riculture Organization, and caloric content of various crops 
with intermediate levels of crop yield (such as 
Austria, New Zealand, and the United States) 
tend to be democracies. In contrast, countries 
both in the bottom decile of the distribution 
of crop yield (including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
and Qatar) and in the top decile of the distri-
bution (including Cuba, Swaziland, and Tan-
zania) tend to be autocracies or exhibit low 
levels of democracy (as measured by Polity2 
for 1961–2015 by Marshall, Gurr, and Jag-
gers 2015).2 In Swaziland, for example, land 
tenure is central to politics (Levin 1987). The 
allocation of land (“Swazi Nation Land”) by 
the king (an absolute monarch) through the 
chiefs is a prominent feature of royal rule. Es-
sentially, the Swazi king is the elite holding 
power over the agricultural sector. 
Using cross-country data from up to 147 
countries, we first establish a hump-shaped 
relationship between crop yield and the av-
erage level of democracy from 1961 to 2015. 
Countries endowed with the least productive 
crop land tend to have low levels of democ-
racy, similar to those countries with the high-
est crop yields. Democracy peaks in the inter-
mediate range of crop yield. This result holds 
up to a host of robustness checks. 
Second, we present results using the Stan-
dard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) assem-
bled by Murdock and White (1969). The 
SCCS provides a representative sample of 
world cultures in 186 societies in precolonial 
times, with minimum influence of the Euro-
pean colonizers. Our two measures of democ-
from U.S. Department of Agriculture Nutrient Database for 
Standard Reference.
2 Appendix Table A1 provides more details. The table in-
cludes no democracy except Norway. While many countries 
in the bottom decile have ample oil reserves, the correlation 
between potential crop yield and (1) oil production/GDP, 
and (2) oil reserves, in our dataset are –0.39 and –0.27, re-
spectively.
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racy reflect the process of succession and ex-
isting executive constraints. We find that the 
inverted U-shape existed before the colonial 
era. This suggests a highly persistent pattern. 
Third, we analyze democracy at the state 
level in the United States, the oldest democ-
racy. As for the measure of democracy, we fol-
low Vanhanen (2000) and utilize voter turnout 
in parliamentary and presidential elections as 
a reflection of active participation of citizens 
in the selection of the executive. The hump-
shaped relationship holds also at the state 
level in the United States. 
Existing theories are unable to fully ex-
plain the hump-shaped relationship estab-
lished in this paper. However, they jointly help 
facilitate our understanding and suggest that 
persistent inequality of income may be an im-
portant mechanism for the empirical pattern 
discovered here. We start with a discussion 
of areas with low crop yield under rain-fed 
conditions, which tend to be arid or semi-arid. 
In such areas, irrigation is necessary for crop 
production. Irrigated agriculture exhibits sub-
stantial scale economies. This raises the size 
of firms and creates barriers to entry. Bentzen, 
Kaarsen, and Wingender (2017) argue that a 
history of irrigation-based agriculture has cre-
ated a resource curse. Economic and political 
elites who controlled the use of water engaged 
in rent-seeking activities, and high levels of in-
equality emerged. These elites have through-
out history been unwilling to allow democ-
racy to develop. On the other hand, suppose 
land was not irrigated (due to low inherent 
land fertility). In such areas people tended to 
engage in long distance transportation (e.g., 
the Bedouins on the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Berbers across the Sahara, and various tribes 
along the Silk Road) or in violent raiding and 
conquering of agricultural areas (Haber and 
Menaldo 2011). In these areas, democratic 
traditions were unlikely to develop. 
At the middle range of crop yield, inde-
pendent (often cereal producing) family farms 
tended to emerge with a more equal distri-
bution of income (Sokoloff and Engerman 
2000; Engerman and Sokoloff 2005a, 2005b). 
Small-scale farmers favored public goods 
such as the protection of property rights, en-
forceable contract law, and quality education. 
These factors facilitated the creation of demo-
cratic traditions.3 
At sufficiently high crop yields, land pro-
vides large rents. Plantation crops such as 
bananas, cocoa, and sugar are often favored. 
Such crops are highly conducive to large 
scale production, owned by a small elite and 
associated with intense rent-seeking, slavery, 
and inequality (Wright 1970; Engerman and 
Sokoloff 1997, 2005a, 2005b; Sokoloff and 
Engerman 2000; Easterly 2007). Lagerlöf’s 
(2009) theoretical model argues that suffi-
ciently high land productivity causes the elite 
to utilize slavery in production. This enables 
the elite to pay workers less than their mar-
ginal product but necessitates costly guards. 
Fenske (2013) provides empirical evidence 
of a positive correlation between land quality 
and slavery in preindustrial Africa.4 Wright 
(1970) argues that the cotton-slavery sector in 
the highly fertile U.S. South was associated 
with a high degree of concentration of income 
and wealth. The economic and political in-
equalities produced by rent-seeking and the 
institution of slavery have persisted for centu-
ries (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Sacerdote 
2005; Nunn 2008a, 2008b; Miller 2012).5 
An advantage of Galor and Özak’s (2016) 
potential crop yield measure is its high degree 
of exogeneity. Using a measure of potential 
calorie output facilitates comparisons across 
countries and sharpens the focus on the histor-
3 Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, democratization 
occurred in Western societies despite rising inequality as-
sociated with industrialization, because the elite wanted 
to avoid social unrest or a revolution. Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) argue that democracy is more likely to persist in ar-
eas with a broad distribution of human capital, and moderate 
rainfall levels led to a broad distribution of human capital 
through a greater prevalence crop types suitable for family 
farms. Family farm production yielded incentives to set up 
institutions that protect private property and make intergen-
erational investments in human capital.
4 Lagerlöf’s (2009) model also suggests that at high levels 
of agricultural productivity, slavery disappears because an 
associated high population density (building on a Malthu-
sian argument) makes free labor cheaper than slaves. This 
model thus predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween slavery and agricultural productivity. However, in 
practice the downward sloping part of this inverted U may 
occur out of sample. 
5 Appendix Figure A1 illustrates a positive correlation be-
tween our measure of crop yield and the fraction of slaves in 
28 New World countries in 1750.
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ical importance of calories in most of human 
history. This paper contributes to the literature 
by establishing a robust nonlinear empirical 
relationship between historical agricultural 
crop production and contemporary demo-
cratic institutions. We believe this is a more 
general finding than that discussed by, for ex-
ample, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), who 
provide case studies of crops such as wheat 
and sugar, not rigorous evidence. 
Our findings are robust to a number of 
checks. These include using several alter-
native democracy and crop yield measures, 
controlling for the potential confounding ef-
fects of historical institutions, accounting for 
various linear and nonlinear effects of early 
development, allowing for various effects of 
contemporary development and social cleav-
ages, among others. Additionally, we employ 
a battery of parametric and nonparametric 
methods to further establish our finding of a 
robust quadratic relationship. 
2. Empirical Approach and Data
Regression Model
In order to evaluate the influence of potential 
crop yield on the degree of democracy, we es-











+ +controls   [1]
where democracyi is the average level of de-
mocracy in country i over the period of study, 
cropyieldi is the potential crop yield in coun-
try i, icontrols  is a vector of control variables 
included in the regression to minimize the 
possibility of getting spurious estimates, and 
i  is the country-specific error term. 
Equation [1] represents a reduced-form 
specification that aims to examine the influ-
ence of potential crop yield on democracy. 1β  
and 2β  are the coefficients of interest. 
Data
This section describes the data for the main 
variables. The summary statistics and a cor-
relation matrix are provided in Appendix Ta-
bles A2 and A3, respectively.
Democracy Measures 
Our baseline sample used in the cross-coun-
try analysis consists of data for up to 147 
countries. Our main measure of democracy is 
the average value of the Polity2 score for the 
period 1961–2015. The data come from the 
Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 
2015). The database provides a democracy 
classification for all independent countries 
with a total population greater than 0.5 mil-
lion in 2015 (167 countries). Polity2 classifies 
regimes on a 21-point scale ranging from –10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy).6 
We focus on the post-1960 period, as most 
of the former European colonies in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, the Middle East, and South and 
East Asia had gained independence by 1960. 
This permits us to explore the effect of poten-
tial crop yield on democracy, while reducing 
the possibility that the results are confounded 
by the colonial powers’ direct influence on 
their former colonies’ domestic institutions. 
However, in the robustness analysis we test 
our model using data spanning alternative 
time periods starting from 1800. Alternative 
democracy measures from Freedom House 
(2016) are also used in robustness checks.
Potential Crop Yield 
The independent variable of interest is an 
index of potential crop yield, measured in 
millions of kilocalories per hectare per year. 
The data are obtained from Galor and Özak 
(2016), who construct a dataset using the 
Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) proj-
ect of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO). GAEZ supplies global yield and 
growth cycle estimates for 48 crops (listed in 
Appendix Section 5) in grids with a cell size 
of 5 feet × 5 feet (approximately 100 km2). 
GAEZ supplies crop yield estimates for each 
crop based on three alternative levels of in-
put (high, medium, and low) and two feasible 
sources of water supply (rain-fed water supply 
and irrigation). The dataset provides potential 
yield estimates for each crop in each agrocli-
matic grid, while accounting for the effect of 
temperature and moisture on crop growth. 
6 Appendix Figure A2 shows the distribution of Polity2 
(average score 1961–2015) across the world.
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The index of potential crop yield is con-
structed using a low level of inputs and rain-
fed agricultural cultivation methods (see 
Appendix Section 5 for more details). This 
reflects farming practices prevalent during 
the early stages of preindustrial development. 
Furthermore, the FAO dataset provides two 
alternative projections of potential yield es-
timates for each crop based on agroecologi-
cal constraints and agroclimatic conditions, 
respectively. The potential crop yield based 
on agroecological constraints can be affected 
by human intervention, while the potential 
crop yield based on agroclimatic conditions 
is arguably unaffected by human interven-
tion. To mitigate concerns of reverse causal-
ity, this index is computed from the potential 
crop yield based on agroclimatic conditions 
under rain-fed low-input agriculture. These 
estimates of potential crop yield account for 
the effect of temperature and precipitation 
on the growth of the crop. In addition to cli-
mate-related “workability constraints,” these 
estimates also consider the impact of pests, 
disease, and weeds on yields. The FAO data-
set also provides estimates of the growth cycle 
for each crop, capturing the number of days it 
takes for each crop from planting to maturity. 
Each crop yield in the GAEZ data (mea-
sured in tons per hectare per year) is converted 
by Galor and Özak (2016) into caloric yield 
(millions of kilocalories per hectare per year). 
This represents the variation in nutrition across 
crops, which facilitates a comparison of crop 
yields. The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Nutrient Database for Standard Ref-
erence provides data on the caloric content of 
various crops. Using these measures, the esti-
mated average regional crop yield reflects the 
average regional levels of two variables, crop 
yield and crop cycle, among crops that max-
imize the caloric yield in each cell. Our anal-
ysis focuses on averages across cells within 
each country. We include only cells where the 
maximum potential crop yield is positive, fol-
lowing Galor and Özak (2016). 
The crop yield index addresses the limita-
tions of other available weight-based agricul-
tural yield indices. For example, the land pro-
ductivity index constructed by Ramankutty et 
al. (2002) does not reflect the fact that equally 
suitable land can have a large variation in crop 
yield, since caloric-intensive crops may not 
be cultivated in some regions (see Galor and 
Özak 2015). 
It is also worth highlighting that we use po-
tential crop yield as a proxy for actual crop 
yield. Actual crop yield is likely to be affected 
by human intervention, which may result in 
spurious estimates. Moreover, autocratic re-
gimes may potentially manipulate crop yield 
data or not share actual data with interna-
tional agencies such as the FAO. Furthermore, 
GAEZ provides actual crop yield data for the 
year 2000 only, which does not provide suf-
ficient exogeneity. Using potential crop yield 
data, however, is not without limitations. Po-
tential sources of measurement errors include 
limited spatial weather data from developing 
countries, local variation in land quality, and 
differential data quality across different areas. 
As a sanity check, we regress (mean) actual 
crop yield on (mean) potential crop yield. 
These variables are significantly correlated, 
conditioning on the baseline geographic influ-
ences.7 Hence, while there is no reliable way 
to tackle the issue of measurement errors, this 
simple analysis provides some credence to us-
ing the potential crop yield data.
Control Variables 
Some geographic features may potentially con-
found the association between crop yield and 
the extent of democracy. In our regressions, we 
therefore control for absolute latitude, terrain 
ruggedness, elevation, variation in elevation, 
landlockedness and distance to nearest water-
way. We also include continent dummies to 
account for any omitted variable bias due to 
time-invariant continent-specific geographi-
cal, cultural, or historical characteristics. 
3. Main Results 
Baseline Regression Results 
Table 1 presents our findings for the influ-
ence of crop yield on the extent of democracy. 
7 Appendix Figure A3 shows the distribution of potential 
crop yield (millions of kilocalories per hectare per year). The 
bottom decile of countries has a crop yield below 908, while 
the top decile has a yield above 11,474 (see Appendix Table 
A1).
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Column (1) reports a positive and significant 
association between potential crop yield and 
the extent of democracy. In column (2) we 
add potential crop yield squared along with 
linear potential crop yield. The result suggests 
a potentially inverted U-shaped association 
between the extent of democracy and poten-
tial crop yield, with a positive coefficient for 
potential crop yield and a negative coefficient 
for the quadratic term. The quadratic pattern 
improves the fit, as both linear and quadratic 
terms are statistically significant and the ad-
justed R2 increases. 
In column (3), we include absolute latitude, 
which captures some climatic influences. Low 
latitudes are often associated with poor soil 
quality, highly variable rainfall, and a high in-
cidence of debilitating tropical diseases (Ols-
son and Hibbs 2005). While absolute latitude 
helps explain the extent of democracy, the in-
fluence of crop yield on democracy remains in-
tact. Our results remain robust to the inclusion 
of additional geographical controls in column 
(4), including terrain ruggedness, average el-
evation, elevation variation, landlockedness, 
and distance to waterways. Finally, we account 
for continent fixed effects in column (5). The 
coefficients of the linear and quadratic crop 
yield variables remain statistically significant 
at the 1% level. We choose the specification in 
column (5) as our baseline model and use it for 
the robustness analysis below.8 
Adding the linear and quadratic effects 
along with other baseline controls, democracy 
reaches a maximum at a potential crop yield 
equal to 7,625 in column (4). The optimal po-
tential crop yield declines marginally to 7,286 
after controlling for continent fixed effects 
in column (5). The optimal level of potential 
crop yield for the United States equals 7,589, 
close to the democracy-maximizing yield in 
the baseline model.
It should be highlighted that a significant 
number of observations are located on either 
side of the peak of the inverted U. Examples 
of democracies (Polity2 score equal to 10) 
8 Appendix Figure A4 illustrates the estimated inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the potential crop yield and 
average democracy.
Table 1
The Effect of Crop Yield on Democracy (Dependent Variable: Polity2)
Baseline













































Optimal crop yield 7,031 7,892 7,625 7,286
Observations 147 147 147 147 147
Continent fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.18 0.37 0.40 0.54
Test for inverted U-shape — 4.76 [p = 0.00] 3.85 [p = 0.00] 4.18 [p = 0.00] 2.83 [p = 0.00]
Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of average crop yield (measured in millions of kilocalories per hectare per 
year) on Polity2 over the period 1961–2015. All specifications use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. The continent dummies are 
Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South America. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
**, *** Significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.
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with crop yields close to the democracy-maxi-
mizing level are Austria (6,815), New Zealand 
(6,538), and the United States (7,590) (crop 
yields in parentheses). A total of 20 countries 
in our sample have average Polity2 scores 
equal to +10, and two countries have average 
scores equal to –10. This artificial censoring 
on the extreme values, imposed by design of 
the Polity2 measure, may affect our estimates, 
since we cannot observe the true value for part 
of the dependent variable and its probability 
density function becomes noncontinuous be-
yond the range. In an additional analysis, we 
therefore repeat the estimations reported in 
Table 1 using Tobit estimations (also known 
as censored regression estimations). The re-
sults are reported in Appendix Table A4. The 
results show that our findings are not driven 
by any arbitrary censuring of the Polity2 data. 
Evidence of an Inverted U-Shaped 
Relationship
We have established that the linear and qua-
dratic terms are statistically significant after 
controlling for baseline controls. We utilize 
several statistical tests and approaches to es-
tablish a hump-shaped relationship, and to 
exclude the possibility of a higher-order non-
linear relationship between contemporary de-
mocracy and potential yield. 
First, we follow Lind and Mehlum (2010), 
who improve upon Sasabuchi’s (1980) test for 
an inverted U-shape. The test results are re-
ported at the bottom of Table 1 and indicate 
that the slope of the estimated curve is in-
creasing for low values of potential crop yield, 
but decreasing for high values. Moreover, the 
optimal yield value associated with a peak 
lies within the data range. Using our baseline 
specification in Table 1 (last column) as an il-
lustration, the test of the positive slope at the 
lowest value of crop yield (0) yields a t-statis-
tic of 4.047 (p = 0.000). In contrast, the test of 
the negative slope at the maximum value of 
potential crop yield (17,998) gives a t-statistic 
of –2.834 (p = 0.000). Overall, the test rejects 
the null hypothesis that the underlying rela-
tionship is monotonic at the 1% level of sig-
nificance (t-statistic = 2.830; p = 0.002), thus 
providing evidence supporting our inverted 
U-shape hypothesis. The results are consis-
tent for columns (2) to (4). Note that we also 
obtain the same result (unreported) when the 
sample is restricted to only non-OECD coun-
tries (t-statistic = 2.440; p = 0.008). 
Second, while the results above provide 
evidence for the presence of a U-shaped rela-
tionship, doing so does not eliminate the pos-
sibility of a higher-order nonlinear relationship 
between contemporary democracy and poten-
tial crop yield. In particular, Simonsohn (2016) 
argues that imposing a quadratic relationship 
and interpreting it as evidence of a U-shaped 
association may be misleading. Rather, we 
should first identify a threshold and then use a 
“two-line” approach to estimate two separate 
linear models for observations above and be-
low the threshold. In our baseline model (last 
column, Table 1), democracy is predicted to 
reach a maximum at the potential crop yield of 
7,286 million kilocalories per hectare per year. 
Following Simonsohn (2016), we estimate the 
linear relationship both below and above this 
threshold. The two linear models presented in 
columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table A5 con-
firm the presence of a statistically significant 
hump-shaped relationship between democracy 
and potential crop yield.
Third, to allow for the possibility of the 
presence of a higher-order relationship, we 
include a cubic term in the model specifica-
tion along with the quadratic relationship. 
This provides a simple test for the presence of 
a possible S-shaped relationship. The results 
presented in column (3) of Appendix Table 
A5 reject the presence of an S-shaped rela-
tionship. Overall, the results of these various 
methods show that the quadratic relationship 
between the level of democracy and potential 
crop yield is robust.9 
4. Robustness of Results
Are the Results Robust to Institutions and 
Early Development?
This section accounts for institutions devel-
oped centuries ago, and other early devel-
9 We provide the results of the Lind-Mehlum test in all 
subsequent tables (where applicable). This does not imply 
that we favor this approach relative to the other two, but is 
due to the ease of reporting. 
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opment indicators. These may possibly have 
confounding effects on the extent of contem-
porary democracy. The results are reported in 
Table 2. Column (1) reports the findings after 
accounting for dummies for the major catego-
ries of the origin of colonizers in our global 
sample: Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and 
other European colonizers. In column (2), we 
restrict our sample to countries that were colo-
nized by a European colonial power only. The 
results in columns (1) and (2) indicate that co-
lonial history does not affect the finding of an 
inverted U-shape.
Olsson (2009) argues that a longer duration 
of colonization has had a positive influence 
on contemporary democracy. Column (3) ac-
counts for this effect. The inverted U-shaped 
pattern survives, although the coefficient sizes 
decrease. The duration of colonization has a 
positive influence on democracy, consistent 
with Olsson (2009). 
The European colonizers transferred their 
legal systems to the colonies, which remained 
after independence. Moreover, these legal 
systems served as role models for countries 
that were never colonized. In column (4) we 
account for British common law, French civil 
law, German civil law, Scandinavian law, and 
socialist law legal origins. Hall and Jones 
(1999) argue that social infrastructure, includ-
ing institutions and government policies, are 
endogenously determined by geography and 
other regional factors. These may be captured 
by language. They utilize the share of Eu-
ropean languages spoken. In a similar vein, 
Easterly and Levine (2016) propose that coun-
tries’ economic characteristics were shaped 
by the share of the population of European 
descent during the colonial era. In column 
(5), we account for the possible confounding 
effects of these two channels. The number of 
observations falls to 118, as data on Euro-
pean language shares are available for fewer 
countries. The early disease environment and 
population health conditions have been shown 
to affect the historical development of insti-
tutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2003). We account for disease environment in 
column (6) by using a measure of pathogen 
stress. Our main result holds.
Next, we focus on five measures of early 
development that may act as possible con-
founders. These are all strongly correlated 
with the current economic development, so-
cial capital, and the quality of institutions. 
First, Ang (2013b) provides evidence that the 
early development of a state influences the de-
velopment of contemporary institutions. We 
use a measure of state antiquity (statehood 
experience) provided by Putterman (2012) for 
the period 1–1500 CE. This index reflects the 
existence of a government, how much territory 
it covered, and whether the government was 
indigenous or externally imposed. The period 
1–1500 CE is divided into 50-year periods, 
discounted by 5% for each half century. Col-
umn (7) suggests that the inverted U-shaped 
relationship survives after accounting for state 
antiquity. 
Second, we control for the timing of the 
agricultural transition (Neolithic revolution), 
namely, the year a country started sedentary 
agricultural practices, consumed mostly cul-
tivated foods, and abandoned the hunter-gath-
erer lifestyle. The timing of this transition 
helps explain, for example, income levels, 
comparative financial development, and tech-
nological advancement (Putterman 2008; Ang 
2013a, 2015). Accounting for the agricultural 
transition in column (8) leads to no qualitative 
changes in the main results.
Our third measure of early development is 
the estimated population density in 1500 CE 
(column 9). The Malthusian theory suggests 
that higher agricultural productivity leads to 
higher fertility, lower mortality, and higher 
population growth, thus hampering economic 
development. Next, Olsson and Hibbs (2005) 
establish that initial biogeographic conditions 
influenced contemporary levels of economic 
development via an early transition to agricul-
ture. Furthermore, Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) 
show that the duration of human settlement in 
a region is positively associated with the level 
of ethnic diversity. This influences contempo-
rary development. We account for these two 
indicators in columns (10) and (11), respec-
tively. The relevant inverted U-shaped associ-
ation continues to hold.
Column (12) accounts for the influence of 
(predicted) genetic diversity. Genetic diver-
sity was determined tens of thousands of years 
ago as humans migrated out of Africa (Ashraf 
and Galor 2013). The literature suggests that 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Land Economics274 May 2020
genetic diversity plays an important role in 
the determination of contemporary productiv-
ity, economic development, ethnic conflicts, 
and social hierarchy (Ashraf and Galor 2011, 
2013; Arbatli et al. 2015; Ashraf, Galor, and 
Klemp 2015; Galor and Klemp 2015). 
We account for the various potential con-
founders simultaneously in column (13). The 
number of observations declines to 113. How-
ever, even after controlling for these early 
development indicators, the hump-shaped 
relationship between potential crop yield and 
democracy survives. 
Next, the recent literature suggests that 
the association between the early develop-
ment indicators and contemporary economic 
development may be more complex than pre-
viously believed (see, e.g., Ashraf and Galor 
2013; Borcan, Olsson, and Putterman 2016). 
A concave relationship may be more accu-
rate. Appendix Table A6 provides estimates 
of alternative specifications where we add 
squared terms for most of the early develop-
ment indicators discussed earlier. The linear 
and squared crop yield coefficients are statis-
tically significant at the 1% level in all speci-
fications. State history and population density 
appear to have concave effects on democracy. 
In contrast, disease environment, years since 
agricultural transition, and biogeography 
(which all had a linear influence in Table 2) 
show no significant effects when their squared 
terms are added. The coefficients of human 
settlement and genetic diversity remain insig-
nificant. The “optimal crop yield” estimates 
remain fairly stable in Table 2, with an aver-
age deviation of 5% from the baseline model 
estimate (Table 1, column 5).
Are the Results Robust to Contemporary 
Development and Social Cleavages?
According to Lipset (1959), a higher per cap-
ita GDP improves the level of democracy. 
Column (1) in Table 3 accounts for (log of) 
per capita GDP in 1960 (just before the start 
of the timing of the outcome variable). The 
sample size declines to 95 countries (due to 
the unavailability of data for some countries 
in the Penn World Table). While the coeffi-
cient of (log of) GDP per capita has a positive 
sign, it is statistically insignificant. 
Next, we study the influence of human cap-
ital on democracy. We measure human capital 
by the amount of schooling. The influence of 
education on democracy is currently unsettled 
in the literature.10 Column (2) controls for the 
average years of schooling in 1960. Our re-
sults suggest that average schooling in 1960 
is complementary to potential crop yield and 
appears to promote democracy. We also use 
several alternative measures of human capital, 
including newspaper circulation per capita, 
following Haber and Menaldo (2011), and 
two human capital stock measures from Lee 
and Lee (2016). The estimates in columns 
(1) to (3) of Appendix Table A7 indicate that 
our results are not influenced by the choice of 
measure for human capital. 
Several studies highlight a negative asso-
ciation between the production of oil and de-
mocracy (e.g., Barro 1999; Ross 2001; Tsui 
2011; Van der Ploeg 2011), consistent with 
the resource curse hypothesis. Multiple coun-
tries in our sample produce oil or have large 
reserves. To mitigate any confounding effects, 
we account for average oil income as a pro-
portion of GDP over the 1961–2015 period. 
Oil income has a negative association with de-
mocracy in column (3). A series of additional 
robustness tests account for the resource curse 
due to having more than one-third of export 
income made up by oil (Appendix Table A7, 
column 4). We use a dummy for OPEC coun-
tries (Appendix Table A7, column 5) and 
control for the presence of oil or diamonds 
(Appendix Table A7, column 6). The baseline 
results remain robust.
While the main objectives of foreign aid 
are to promote economic growth and improve 
10 On the one hand, education promotes a “culture of 
democracy” according to Dewey (1916). Similarly, Lipset 
(1959) argues that educated people understand the need 
for norms of tolerance; they make more rational electoral 
choices as education broadens people’s outlook. Lipset 
(1959) suggests that education is “close to being a necessary 
condition” for democracy. Castelló-Climent (2008) finds a 
positive empirical association between education and de-
mocracy (see also Murtin and Wacziarg 2014). In contrast, 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) find no effect of education on de-
mocracy. They argue that the statistical associations between 
education and democracy in previous studies disappear 
when time and country fixed effects are introduced. How-
ever, they do not reject the possibility of a causal relationship 
between education and democracy in the long term.
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institutional quality in recipient countries, 
recent studies have questioned the effective-
ness of foreign aid infusion (e.g., Svensson 
2000; Rajan and Subramanian 2007; Nunn 
and Qian 2014). Column (4) accounts for av-
erage foreign aid (net official development aid 
as a fraction of the recipient country’s GDP) 
over the period 1961–2015. Recent studies 
suggest that religion and political regime may 
have an association (e.g., Woodberry 2012).11 
Column (5) controls for the percentage of the 
population that follows Protestantism, Roman 
Catholicism, Islam, and Hinduism. The rele-
vant inverted U-shaped relationship remains 
robust. Next, we control for the potentially 
confounding effects of population heteroge-
neity. Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003) 
construct measures of diversity including eth-
nic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, 
utilized in column (6). Only language frac-
tionalization has a significant effect. 
Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport (2016) 
propose a diversity index for the place of birth 
of immigrants. With increased migration, the 
cultural norms and practices of a region may 
change. Similarly, Docquier et al. (2016) pro-
pose that the emigration rate is associated with 
the development of institutions in the country 
of origin. We account for birthplace diversity 
and emigration rate in columns (7) and (8). 
Next, including a measure of the variation in 
potential crop yield in column (9) suggests a 
positive association with democracy, contrary 
to expectations. Bentzen, Kaarsen, and Win-
gender (2017) argue that in arid and semi-arid 
regions, irrigation is necessary and exhibits 
scale economies. The elite have had control 
over water and restricted the development of 
democracy. The coefficient on irrigation po-
tential in column (10) takes the expected nega-
tive sign and is significant. Finally, in columns 
(11) and (12) we control for trade openness 
11 Protestant missionaries may have spread moral and cul-
tural values that facilitated the development of democracy. 
For instance, the emphasis on reading the bible in vernacular 
languages promoted education and the printing press, foun-
dations of modern democracy (Woodberry 2012). In con-
trast, Barro (1999) and Karatnycky (2002) argue that Islam 
promotes cultural values that are impediments to democratic 
regimes. While there is a perception of a strong association 
between Islam and authoritative institutions, survey data 
provide contradictory results (Rowley and Smith 2009).
and the contribution of agriculture to GDP, re-
spectively. No qualitative changes occur in the 
inverted U-shaped association between poten-
tial crop yield and democracy. Similar to the 
earlier findings, the estimates of the “optimal 
crop yield” are found to be fairly stable when 
additional controls are considered. 
Are the Results Robust to Alternative 
Measures?
Many countries have historically experienced 
sharp changes in the level of democracy. The 
choice of time period of study may conse-
quently affect our results. We therefore vary 
the time period over which the average de-
mocracy level is measured. In column (1) of 
Table 4, we use all available Polity2 data since 
1800. The inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween crop yield and democracy remains ro-
bust. The relevant coefficients are significant 
at the 1% level and are qualitatively similar 
to those in our baseline results in Table 1. The 
fit of the model declines by roughly one-third. 
However, being able to explain 36% of the 
average cross-country variation in democracy 
over more than two centuries is still notable, 
in our view. Column (1) supports our argu-
ment that the inverted U-shaped relationship 
holds in the very long run. 
In columns (2) through (4), the starting year 
is 1901, 1931, and 1991, respectively. While 
the inverted U-shape survives in columns (2) 
and (3), the squared potential crop yield term 
becomes insignificant at conventional levels 
in column (4). This may be due to the third 
wave of democratization, which saw a sudden 
adoption of democracy by a number of coun-
tries after the end of the cold war (Russett et 
al. 1993). We also utilize various subsamples 
of data from the nineteenth century; the subsa-
mple periods are 1800–1850, 1800–1900, and 
1851–1900 in columns (5) through (7). The 
inverted U-shaped relationship holds at the 
10% level for sample period 1800–1900, and 
1851–1900. However, the result does not hold 
for the 1800–1850 period. One possibility is 
that the number of observations has fallen dra-
matically, and another is that the Polity2 data 
for the earlier period are less reliable. 
While Polity2 is the most widely used 
measure of democracy in the literature, it is 
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a composite score that may mask the degree 
of institutional democracy. To mitigate such 
concerns, we utilize several alternative mea-
sures of institutional democracy. First, we 
create a measure using Democ from the Pol-
ity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 
2015). Democ takes values between 0 and 10, 
where a higher value indicates a higher level 
of institutional democracy. The average over 
the years 1961–2015 is labeled DemocAve. 
Similarly, a higher value of Autoc from the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 
2015) indicates a higher level of institutional 
autocracy. This variable is reverse coded so 
that higher values of Autoc imply greater 
democracy. AutocAve is the average Autoc 
value for the years 1961–2015. The results for 
using DemocAve and AutocAve are presented 
in columns (8) and (9), respectively. The find-
ings remain intact. 
Next, Polity2 is an ordinal variable taking 
values from –10 through +10. A higher posi-
tive (more negative) value indicates a higher 
level of democracy (autocracy). However, the 
boundary between democracy and autocracy 
is not exact. We therefore construct measures 
of democracy and autocracy using Polity2 that 
differentiate strong democracy from autoc-
racy. For the democracy measure, we assign a 
value of 1 if Polity2 is above 5 in a particular 
year and 0 otherwise. We then calculate the 
mean value for 1961–2015. This represents 
the fraction of years that a country has de-
mocracy during this time period. The fraction 
of years that a country has autocracy is calcu-
lated using the same approach, but based on 
the criterion that Polity2 is below –5. These 
two outcome measures are used in columns 
(10) and (11), respectively. The hump-shaped 
influence of potential crop yield on democ-
racy remains intact.12
Freedom House (2016) also provides data 
for a large number of countries from 1973 on-
ward on civil liberties and political rights. The 
12 While these variables seem largely similar to Democ 
and Autoc (they contain similar information), their values 
are not identical to those of Democ and Autoc. For exam-
ple, the United States is assigned a democracy value of 7 
and an autocracy value of 3 for the year 1800 in the Polity 
IV database. Hence, the resulting Polity2 score is 4 for that 
year. According to our approach, Democ is assigned 1 but 
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two indices have a correlation coefficient of 
0.97. We transform these measures so that a 
higher value indicates the presence of a more 
democratic regime. Column (12) uses the 
mean of these two indices, averaged over the 
years 1973–2015, as the outcome variable. 
The inverted U-shaped relationship remains 
unbroken.
Moreover, we utilize three additional mea-
sures of democracy. First, Boix, Miller, and 
Rosato (2012) compile a dichotomous mea-
sure of democracy. A country is defined as 
democratic if it satisfies the conditions for both 
contestation and participation. Specifically, 
political leaders are chosen through free and 
fair elections, and the level of suffrage is above 
a threshold level. Next, Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland’s (2010) dichotomous measure of 
democracy focuses on how incumbent leaders 
are removed. Lastly, Keefer (2012) creates a 
measure of checks and balances. The results 
using these three additional measures are re-
ported in columns (13) through (15). Potential 
crop yield and these three alternative mea-
sures of democracy continue to show inverted 
U-shaped associations, with the linear and 
squared term coefficients remaining statisti-
cally significant in all specifications. 
In order to mitigate concerns that our re-
sults are driven by the choice of crop yield 
measure, we use several alternative measures. 
First, significant cross-country migration has 
occurred since the sixteenth century. In par-
ticular, a large proportion of the current pop-
ulations in the New World migrated from the 
Old World. The migrants carried with them 
their knowledge, cultural traits, and institu-
tional values (Putterman and Weil 2010). This 
cross-border exchange and dissemination of 
ideas may have impacted the formation of 
democratic regimes. We therefore account 
for the original location of the current popu-
lations’ ancestors by premultiplying our crop 
yield measures with the world migration ma-
trix constructed by Putterman and Weil (2010) 
to create the ancestry-adjusted potential crop 
yield measures. The adjusted measures in 
column (16) take the country of origin of the 
immigrants in each country’s population into 
account so that we can shed some light on 
whether the diffusion of ideas via migration, 
apart from the actual location of crop yield, 
also matters. The inverted U-shaped associa-
tion between ancestry-adjusted potential crop 
yield and the extent of democracy endures.
Second, in column (17) we use the land 
suitability index developed by Ramankutty et 
al. (2002). This index ranges from 0 to 1 and 
reflects suitability for farming based on soil 
quality and climate. The results are robust to 
this alternative measure of crop yield. Finally, 
we study the effect of potential crop yield per 
capita. The literature discusses the relevance 
of the land-labor ratio for institutional out-
comes (e.g., Lagerlöf 2009; Fenske 2013). 
The Malthusian theory argues that a higher 
level of crop yield per person should result in 
higher population density. Column (18) uses 
potential crop yield per person. The inverted 
U-shaped relationship remains intact. 
Overall, it appears that the identified asso-
ciation between potential crop yield and de-
mocracy is quite robust to different measures 
of crop yield. Reassuringly, Lind and Me-
hlum’s (2010) test rejects the null hypothesis 
that the underlying relationship is monotone 
or U-shaped at conventional levels of signif-
icance in all columns, except columns (4), 
(11), and (15).
Is the Democracy Index a Proxy for Risk 
Aversion?
Matranga (2017) argues that higher levels of 
climate seasonality induced risk-averse no-
madic hunter-gatherers to invent sedentary 
agriculture, with more stable food sources. 
Seasonality and risk aversion may also have 
caused other cultural traits. To account for the 
possibility that democracy has been adopted 
by more risk averse populations, we add mea-
sures of risky behaviors to the baseline controls 
in Appendix Table A7. Our three measures of 
risky behavior come from the country averages 
on three questions in the World Values Sur-
vey (waves 5 and 6) (Inglehart et al. 2014). 
We construct the risk avoidance indices using 
individual-level response data from this survey 
(waves 5 and 6) for the following questions: 
“living in secure surroundings is important to 
this person (A191)” and “adventure and tak-
ing risks are important to this person (A195).” 
We further compile another index (wave 6) on 
things done for reasons of security (H003), 
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including “didn’t carry much money,” “pre-
ferred not to go out at night,” and “carried a 
knife, gun, or other weapon.” Results after con-
trolling for the confounding effects of these 
indices of risky behavior (or risk aversion) are 
reported in columns (7) to (9) in Appendix Ta-
ble A7. The number of observations decreases 
by more than half. However, the hump-shaped 
relation between potential crop yield and the 
level of democracy remains intact. 
Distance to the Frontier
The literature shows that humans learn from 
and trust others who are similar to themselves 
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009). An ex-
ogenous measure of barriers to diffusion of 
ideas between societies is genetic distance 
(Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009). Genetic dis-
tance measures the time elapsed since two 
societies had a common ancestor. Using ge-
netic distance, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) 
show that income difference between societ-
ies can be explained by genetic distance from 
the technological frontier. Similarly, Gorod-
nichenko and Roland (2017) use a measure of 
frequencies of blood types as genetic distance 
to explain the variation in income across coun-
tries. Could the variation in democracy across 
countries reflect different cultural traits? 
Could genetic distance constitute a barrier to 
the diffusion of democracy, whereas the oldest 
democracy the United States is the frontier? 
To account for these possible confounding ef-
fects, we control for both genetic distance and 
blood distance to the United States in columns 
(10) and (11) in Appendix Table A7. These 
variables are found to have no effect on the 
level of democracy. 
Are the Results Robust to Restricted 
Sample Estimation?
In this section, we restrict the sample using 
different criteria. First, the inverted U-shaped 
influence of potential crop yield on democ-
racy may possibly be driven by a particular 
region. To mitigate such concerns, we se-
quentially drop all observations belonging 
to a particular continent. We then reestimate 
our baseline model in the last column of Table 
1. Column (1) in Appendix Table A8 restates 
this baseline result using the global sample. 
Columns (2) through (7) report the results 
from dropping one continent at a time. The in-
verted U-shape remains robust in all six mod-
els. Next, the New World’s institutions were 
largely set up by the migrants from the Old 
World. Many characteristics of early develop-
ment did not exist in the New World. When 
we exclude New World countries in column 
(8), the results remain intact in the Old World 
subsample. Finally, in column (9) we restrict 
the sample to 57 industrialized countries, de-
fined as those with shares of agriculture below 
the global mean during the period 1991–2000. 
The decline of the importance of agriculture 
is likely to be most acute in these economies. 
Both the linear and quadratic crop yield co-
efficients are significant at the 1% level, de-
spite the smaller sample. The results suggest 
a high degree of persistence in the effect of 
crop yield.
Pre-1500 Potential Crop Yield and Trade 
Costs
We have utilized post-1500 potential crop 
yield data. An alternative would be pre-1500 
potential crop yield data. There is a strong 
correlation between these two measures 
(0.92), due to most sample countries having 
added only a few new crops during the Co-
lumbian exchange. Here, we explore whether 
the introduction of new crops affects our main 
hypothesis. 
Many areas in the New World were 
sparsely inhabited, and a large fraction of the 
indigenous population died after contact with 
the European explorers (Koch et al. 2019). 
Koch et al. (2019) argue that the total 1600 
CE population in the Americas was 6.1 mil-
lion. Thus, the population currently residing 
in New World countries has had little expo-
sure to the pre-1500 potential crop yield. Col-
umns (1) and (2) of Table 5 utilize the Old 
World subsample to study the relationship 
between contemporary democracy (average 
Polity2 over 1961–2015) and the pre-1500 
and post-1500 potential crop yields, respec-
tively. We note that the pre-1500 data may be 
of relatively lower quality. The proposed re-
lationship holds in both cases. The pre-1500 
coefficients in column (1) exhibit somewhat 
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greater levels of significance than the post-
1500 coefficients in column (2). 
The dispersion of both new crops and de-
mocracy may be related to trade costs. We ac-
count for contemporary trade openness in Ta-
ble 3, column (11). However, the trade costs 
involved with the Columbian exchange in the 
fifteenth to sixteenth centuries are more rele-
vant. To the best of our knowledge, no reliable 
data are available for bilateral trade costs for 
this period. However, assuming that imports 
of seeds and plants were free of customs du-
ties during this period, the cost of trade should 
largely be reflected by distance.13 We control 
for navigational distance between Cama-
ret-sur-mer, France, and the closest port of 
historic importance in each country. We dis-
regard routes going through the Suez or Pan-
ama canals. Column (3) in Table 5 indicates 
that the trade costs did not play a significant 
role in explaining the relationship between 
13 Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2008) find that between 
1870 and 2000, a 1 standard deviation rise in distance raised 
trade costs by 0.4 standard deviations.
the potential crop yield and contemporary 
democracy. Our main result remains robust. 
Do the Results Hold for 1500 CE? 
To emphasize that the level of crop yield has 
had a long-term influence on democracy, we 
construct a measure of democracy in 1500 CE 
using data from Acemoglu et al. (2008).14 We 
repeat the Table 1 baseline model using pre-
1500 potential crop yield data and the 1500 
CE democracy measure. The results survive, 
as reported in column (4), Table 5. This sug-
gests that the relationship between potential 
crop yield and democracy can potentially be 
interpreted in a causal sense rather than sim-
ply reflecting a correlation. 
Are the Results Robust to Specific Crops, 
Precipitation, and Temperature?
Easterly (2007) uses data on the suitability of 
cereals versus plantation crops to document 
14 Acemoglu et al. (2008) compile a dataset on the change 
in the level of democracy over 1500–2000.
Table 5
Pre-1500 versus Post-1500 Potential Crop Yield and Democracy

































Continent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 123 123 102 125
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.54 0.32 0.56
Test for inverted U-shape 3.91 2.25 2.83 5.03
[p = 0.000] [p = 0.013] [p = 0.002] [p = 0.000]
Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of potential crop yield (measured in millions 
of kilocalories per hectare per year) on Polity2 over the period 1961–2015 (column 1–3) and on a measure of 
democracy in 1500, using data from Acemoglu et al. (2008) in column (4). Baseline controls used are absolute 
latitude, terrain ruggedness, elevation (average), elevation (variation), landlockedness, and distance to water-
ways. All specifications use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. Robust t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. 
*** Significance at the 1% level. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.
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that cereal production causes greater income 
equality and quality institutions, as discussed 
by Engerman and Sokoloff (Engerman and 
Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman 
2000). Thus, these crops may have confound-
ing effects. Moreover, Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) find an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between precipitation levels and democracy. 
They argue that rainfall levels affect the suit-
ability for growing crops of different storabil-
ity. Storable crops create incentives to trade, 
protect property rights, and invest in human 
capital. Rainfall is also an important determi-
nant of actual crop yield. Columns (1) to (3) 
in Appendix Table A9 report the results from 
including different cereal and plantation crops 
suitability measures used by Easterly (2007). 
Columns (4) to (5) present results that control 
for average precipitation and its square. 
Moreover, Haber and Menaldo (2011) use 
the average precipitation around a country’s 
largest city. They argue that institutions tend 
to develop first in the main city and then dif-
fuse around the country. Following Haber and 
Menaldo (2011), we construct an average pre-
cipitation index and two restricted cubic pre-
cipitation splines around the largest city for 
1980–1989.
One alternative to using polynomials to 
check for nonlinearity is to use splines. The 
main advantage of this approach is that it 
involves a nonlinear transformation of the 
explanatory variable prior to running regres-
sions. The splines are therefore not influenced 
by the dependent variable. Following Haber 
and Menaldo (2011), we construct a restricted 
cubic spline for the logs of precipitation. The 
underlying assumption is that precipitation is 
linear before the first and after the last knot, 
but forms a cubic piecewise polynomial shape 
between these knots. Our results remain intact 
in column (6) in Appendix Table A9. Similar 
to Haber and Menaldo (2011), the first spline 
of precipitation is positive, while the second 
spline is negative but insignificant. 
Finally, since temperature levels should 
also affect crop suitability, in column (7) in 
Appendix Table A9 we add a measure of av-
erage temperature for the period 1961–1990. 
One of the measures of cereal to plantation 
crop suitability (column 2) and the linear ef-
fect of precipitation in all models (columns 4, 
5, and 6) are significant. The presence of pre-
cipitation measures attenuates the influence of 
potential crop yield, indicating that precipita-
tion is complementary to potential crop yield. 
Overall, the crop yield coefficients remain 
significant in all cases in Appendix Table A9.
5. Further Evidence 
Evidence from Precolonial Indigenous 
Societies 
This section utilizes data from 186 preco-
lonial societies. The data are available from 
the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), 
compiled by Murdock and White (1969). 
The SCCS provides a representative sam-
ple of world cultures “for the earliest period 
for which satisfactory ethnographic data are 
available or can be constructed” (Murdock 
and White 1969, 340). The aim is to avoid the 
influence of European colonizers on these so-
cieties (Murdock and White 1969).15 
The SCCS database provides information 
on two important political dimensions in pre-
colonial societies. The first relates to how the 
process of “local political succession” oc-
curred. The database categorizes the process 
of succession into nine different categories, 
namely, no headmen or council, by appoint-
ment, seniority, divination, informal consen-
sus, electoral process, patrilineal, matrilineal, 
and hereditary without personal qualifica-
tions. We consider the process of local po-
litical succession to be democratic if it took 
place through either “informal consensus” or 
“electoral process,” otherwise not. Second, 
the SCCS provides information on the exec-
utive constraints. This could be either a coun-
cil, the “executive and council,” or “plural ex-
ecutives,” or a “single leader.” We consider a 
society to be democratic when the executive 
power rests with an “executive and council” 
(similar to a parliament in contemporary rep-
15 The possibility exists that these societies’ cultures had 
been influenced by contacts with Europeans. The years of 
observation are in the nineteenth or early twentieth century. 
Murdock and White (1969, 329) suggest that “cultural inde-
pendence of each unit in terms of historical origin and cul-
tural diffusion could be considered maximal with respect to 
the other societies in the sample.” 
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resentative democracies), rather than with 
“plural executives” or a “single leader.” 
We follow the baseline specification in col-
umn (5) in Table 1. Using the SCCS database, 
the unit of analysis is at the society level. The 
SCCS database does not contain information 
about the land area covered by these precolo-
nial societies. While the centroid of each so-
ciety is obtained from the dataset, measuring 
their precise locations may involve errors. Fol-
lowing Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), 
we use a buffer zone of 200 km around the 
centroid in order to extract the independent 
variables and other control variables from 
other datasets. The (mean) crop yield for a 
society is thus calculated using the circular 
land area around the centroid with a radius of 
200 km. This is combined with the global crop 
yield dataset based on a raster image, made 
available by Galor and Özak (2015, 2016). We 
also control for geographic variables in the 
analysis such as distance to the coast, eleva-
tion, variation in elevation, and roughness of 
variation, which are generated from G-Econ 
(2008) by, again, using a radius of 200 km 
around the centroid of each society.
The empirical findings are reported in 
Table 6. Columns (1a) to (1c) use the “local 
political succession” measure of democracy, 
while columns (2a) to (2c) study the “concen-
tration of power in executive.” Columns (1a) 
and (2a) report the unconditional influence of 
crop yield on these two variables. The next 
columns include all baseline controls, and the 
last columns control for regional fixed effects. 
The evidence suggests an inverted U-shaped 
influence of crop yield on our measures of 
democracy in precolonial societies. The full 
model specifications in columns (1c) and (2c) 
are able to explain 16% and 24%, respectively, 
of the variation in democracy in precolonial 
societies.
Evidence from the State Level 
In this section, we address the possibility 
there may be some unobserved effects that are 
correlated with democracy and the measure 
of crop yield at the national level. We address 
this concern by running regressions at the 
state level for the United States. 
Wright (1970) provides evidence that in 
1860, the cotton (the only cash crop) pro-
ducing South (Gini index equal to 57.7) 
had larger farms compared to six Northern 
Table 6
Using Preindustrial Societies Data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample
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Executive
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of Power in 
Executive
Concentration 


























Observations 137 137 137 68 68 68
Baseline controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.24
Language clusters 40 40 40 24 24 24












Note: This table presents standardized coefficients for the effect of crop yield (measured in millions of kilocalories per hectare per year) on two 
alternative definitions of democracy from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS). The baseline controls used are absolute latitude, rough-
ness of elevation, elevation (average), elevation (variation), and distance to a coast. Latitude of the societies is from the SCCS database, while 
other controls—roughness of elevation, elevation (average), elevation (variation), and distance to a coast—are generated from G-Econ (2008) us-
ing a 200 km radius around each society. The region dummies are sub-Saharan Africa, Middle Old World, Southeast Asia/Insular Pacific, Sahul, 
North Eurasia/Circumpolar, Northwest Coast of North America, North and West of North America, Eastern Americas, Mesoamerica/Andes, and 
Far South America, as described in the SCCS database. All specifications use an intercept term, but it is not reported for brevity. Standard errors 
are clustered at the language group level. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
**, *** Significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test for an inverted U-shape uses Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) approach.
96(2) 285Ang, Fredriksson, and Gupta: Crop Yield and Democracy
states.16 Within the South, the region with the 
most fertile soil type (alluvial soil), had the 
highest Gini index of 63.5.17 Moreover, for 
every soil type region, an index of concen-
tration is greater for farm value than for area 
(improved acreage). In the alluvial region, the 
largest 10% of farms had 50.6% of agricul-
tural land, but the most valuable 10% of farms 
owned 64.1% of total farm value. The aver-
age index of concentration of farm value in 
the South was 67.8 in the year 1860, while it 
was 78.0 in the alluvial region. The concen-
tration of slaveholdings in the alluvial region 
was roughly equal to the average in the South, 
however. Wright (1970) argues that high-qual-
ity land was very expensive, necessitating cot-
ton (cash crop) production and the purchase of 
slaves; thus, all sizes of farms in highly fertile 
areas owned slaves. Wright (1970) concludes 
that the effect of the cotton-slavery sector was 
to raise the level of concentration of income 
and wealth. In our view, this has led to an ag-
riculturally based resource curse within the 
United States.
One difficulty involved with estimating 
our model at the state-national level is the 
absence of a readily available index of de-
mocracy. Fortunately, a major component of 
composite democracy indices is the level of 
active participation of citizens in the selec-
tion of the executive (Vanhanen 2000). Most 
democratic theorists assert that without sig-
nificant citizen involvement, the democratic 
process falls short of its goals. Therefore, par-
ticipation by citizens in competitive elections 
is a distinctive feature of democratic politics 
(Powell 1982). In a high-quality democracy, 
citizens must have equal participation rights 
(Banducci, Donovan, and Karp. 2004; Pax-
ton et al. 2003). Lijphart (1997) views low 
voter turnout as an indicator of unequal and 
socioeconomically biased political participa-
tion, a serious problem for democracy. Soli-
jonov (2016) argues that high voter turnout 
16 The Northern states for which data are available are 
(Gini index within parentheses) Illinois (43.6), Iowa (44.0), 
Indiana (45.2), Minnesota (34.2), Ohio (43.8), and Wiscon-
sin (45.2).
17 The alluvial soil region is located along the Mississippi 
River in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas; along the 
Red River in Louisiana; and in three Texas counties at the 
mouth of the Brazos River.
is often a sign of the vitality of a democracy. 
In contrast, low turnout is usually associated 
with voter apathy and mistrust of the political 
process. Low electoral turnout is either inher-
ently bad for democracy, or calls legitimacy 
into question by suggesting a lack of repre-
sentation of a certain group (Franklin 1999). 
Following Powell (1982) and Diamond and 
Morlino (2005), we use voter turnout rates 
as the measure of citizen’s participation in 
the governance of their country, and thus as a 
measure of the degree of democracy. 
We use voter turnout as a fraction of the 
total electorate as a measure of the elector-
ate’s participation across states in the United 
States. We use average presidential election 
voter turnout for the period 1980–2012. We 
reuse the baseline regression model in the last 
column of Table 1 but replace country-level 
variables by state-level variables, including 
the geographical control variables.
Table 7 presents our findings for the influ-
ence of crop yield on democracy at the state 
level. Column (1) documents unconditional 
influences, while we add latitude and other 
baseline controls in columns (2) and (3), re-
spectively. The inverted U-shaped association 
between potential crop yield and democracy 
survives at the state level in the United States. 
Then, we account for the four regional and 
nine divisional fixed effects in columns (4) 
and (5), respectively, to account for any unob-
served effects. There is no qualitative change 
in our findings. Next, we control for the frac-
tion of Blacks and Hispanics in the population 
in columns (6) and (7), respectively. While 
the nineteenth amendment granted women the 
right to vote in 1922, in some states this right 
had already been extended beforehand. In col-
umn (8) we account for whether a state had 
granted voting rights to women before 1922. 
These controls have negative signs, as ex-
pected, though all are insignificant. However, 
the inverted U-shape remains intact.
We also account for cultural values, in-
cluding religious adherence, estimates of the 
population attending a place of prayer, and 
family ties. These account for confounding 
effects of informal institutions on democracy. 
Family ties can influence the quality of insti-
tutions (Alesina and Giuliano 2014). Next, we 
account for the age dependency ratio, school 
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enrolment, and income per capita. Our main 
result survives in columns (9) through (13). 
We caution that using voter turnout as an 
indicator of democracy has some limitations. 
For example, potential voters may face no 
barriers to participate in elections, but for var-
ious reasons abstain from voting. Neverthe-
less, we believe the results at the state level 
provide complementary evidence that lends 
further support to our hypothesis. Lind and 
Mehlum’s (2010) test supports the notion that 
potential crop yield and democracy exhibit an 
inverted U-shaped relationship.
6. Conclusion
The evolution of most ancient civilizations 
and modern nations has, in one way or an-
other, been centered on agriculture. Through-
out history, agriculture has been a driving 
force in economic, social, and political de-
velopment. This paper shows that geography 
helps explain the degree of democracy. We 
establish an inverted U-shaped empirical re-
lationship between crop yield (measured in 
terms of calories) and the contemporary level 
of democracy. We establish this hump-shaped 
relationship using cross-country data, data 
from precolonial societies, and state-level data 
from the United States. Our results are robust 
to an array of tests and checks. We believe this 
is the first paper to provide rigorous evidence 
of an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
crop yield and the level of democracy. 
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